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5.1 Introduction
In domestic legal systems, one may assume that in B2B relationships the parties usually
are of similar bargaining power and have the same knowledge or at least the same access
to knowledge, however things are different when it comes to cross border transactions
especially on the global scale. Parties from developed countries may contract with parties
from transitioning or developing countries. Inequality of bargaining power, difference in
sophistication, unequal access to knowledge are to be taken into account and pose real
challenges for drafting a sales law that strikes a fair balance for sellers and buyers coming
from such different backgrounds.
In Brazil, the CISG entered into force on 1April 2014.1Today it has 83member states.2
Thus the CISG potentially covers more than 80% of world trade.3 If we were to group the
member states into the three categories of developed, transitioning anddeveloping countries
we find that each category roughly accounts for one third of the whole number ofmember
states. This in itself suggests that the CISG has been able to accommodate the interests of
all parties from countries around the globe without privileging one or the other.
Inmy presentation I will show how, indeed, the CISGhas succeeded in fairly balancing
the interests of sellers and buyers come they from developed, transitioning or developing
countries. As an example, I will focus on the rules on conformity of the goods and on the
possible remedies following a breach of contract, two core areas of any sales law.
* Dr. iur (Freiburg, Germany), LL.M. (Berkeley, USA), Professor of Private Law, University of Basel,
Switzerland. The author would like to express her gratitude to Meret Rehmann, BLaw, Student Assistant,
University of Basel, Switzerland, for assistance in editing this article.
1 <www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html>.
2 Id.
3 I. Schwenzer, ‘Diverging Interpretations: Reasons and Solutions’, in L. DiMatteo (ed.), International Sales
Law – A Global Challenge (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2014) p. 103.
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5.2 Conformity of the Goods
5.2.1 Historical Development in Different Legal Systems
Let me briefly recall how different domestic legal systems approach the question of con-
formity of the goods.
Most civil law legal systems are still verymuch influenced by Roman law that was firmly
based on the principle of caveat emptor i.e. let the buyer beware.4 Seller’s liability depended
onwhether it had given a special promise, a stipulatio, or whether it had acted fraudulently,
with dolus.5 This clearly privileges the seller. Though, the maxim of caveat emptor could
also be found in the old English Common law.6
Domestic legal systems are further highly complicated as many of them distinguish
between cases of non-conformity and cases of non-delivery.7 If the goods do not possess
the features called under the contract thismay be treated as a so-called aliudwhich triggers
the rules of non-delivery and not as a peius which entails the rules on non-conformity.8
Defects in quantity likewise are treated as partial non-delivery.9 In mixed contracts where
service obligations accompany the delivery of the goods, it must be exactly determined
whether the breach of contract relates to the quality of the goods or to a breach of the service
obligation.10
Furthermore, extremely seller-friendly rules are found in many Commercial Codes of
Civil law legal systems.11 The buyer is obliged to examine the goods and to inform the
seller about any defect in quality or quantity.12 Failure to give notice regularly engenders
the loss of any right and action relating to the non-conformity.13
To sumup,most notably Civil law legal systems tend to be seller friendly and disregard
the buyer’s legitimate interests in case of goods not conforming to the contract. Whereas
this may be appropriate in the domestic context, it may yield highly unsatisfactory results
on the international level where for instance complex machinery is sold by a seller from a
developed country to a buyer in a transitioning country.
4 Cf. I. Schwenzer, P. Hachem & C. Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law (Oxford University Press, New York
2012) p. 362, para. 31.06.
5 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 367, para. 31.26.
6 L. Charlesworth, ‘Consumer Protection in the Sale of Goods Agreements: An Ancient Right in Modern
Guise?’ (1994) 16 Liverpool Law Review p. 177.
7 Cf. Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 363, para. 31.09.
8 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, pp. 365 et seq., para. 31.22.
9 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 374, para. 31.59.
10 Cf. Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 385, para. 31.104.
11 E.g. German, Swiss and French Law, I. Schwenzer, P. Hachem & C. Kee, supra note 4, pp. 367 et seq., paras.
31.26 et seq.
12 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 366, para. 31.23.
13 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 440, para. 34.76.
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5.2.2 Non-Conformity under the CISG
The CISG not only simplifies the very structure of the rules on non-conformity, it is also
flexible enough to accommodate all kinds of transactions and parties in international
commerce and trade.
First of all, the CISG adopts a very broad notion of conformity.14 The key concept laid
down in Article 35 of the CISG treats any defect in quality, quantity and type as well as
packaging alike.15Thus all the distinctions known fromCivil law jurisdictions such as peius
v. aliud, partial non-delivery or breach of ancillary obligations become superfluous.16 The
same applies with regard to distinctions between guarantees and simple defects, obvious
defects (vice apparent) and hidden defects (vice caché), conditions, warranties and inter-
mediate terms or express and implied warranties as they are found in Common law juris-
dictions.17 This very simplification significantly ameliorates the situation of the aggrieved
buyer. In any case of a non-conformity, the buyer must just prove that the contractual
expectations are notmet. There is no need to prove the exact cause of the non-conformity.
Let me give you one example. Where a seller has to deliver a paper mill and undertakes to
instruct and supervise the personnel of the buyer in setting up the machinery and starting
to operate it, the seller is liable if the mill does not function properly, no matter whether
the delivered machinery is defective or incomplete due to its own features or to a lack of
adequate packaging or whether the seller has breached any of its service obligations.
The starting point to determine the conformity of the goods is the contract itself.18 It
is up to the parties to clearly specify the standard that the goods have to live up to. Thus
these days within many sales contracts we may find specifications as to the origin of the
goods as well as to manufacturing practices. Such specifications make the expectations of
both parties very predictable.
If the parties have not agreed to specific features in their contract, the CISG provides
for a well-balanced default system based on objective criteria.19 First of all, the goods must
be fit for any particular purpose the buyer wants them for.20Again however, this provision
weighs the interests of the buyer as well as the seller. First, the particular purpose for which
the goods are bought must be expressly or impliedly made known to the seller at the time
14 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 369, para. 31.38.
15 I. Schwenzer, in I. Schwenzer (Ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary on the UN Convention on the
International Sale of Goods (CISG) (3rd edn., Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) Art. 35, para. 4.
16 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 369, para. 31.39.
17 Schwenzer, supra note 15, Art. 35, para. 4.
18 Schwenzer, supra note 15, Art. 35, para. 6.
19 Schwenzer, supra note 15, Art. 35, para. 12.
20 Cf. in that regard P. Schlechtriem, ‘Die Pflichten desVerkäufers und die Folgen ihrerVerletzung, insbesondere
bezüglich der Beschaffenheit derWare’, in E. Bucher (ed.),Wiener Kaufrecht (Stämpfli, Bern, 1991) pp. 116-
117 with numerous instructive examples.
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of the conclusion of the contract.21This leaves ample room to consider the individual facts
of each case and to adequately balance the interests of the buyer and the seller. If the buyer
does not explicitly mention the particular purpose for which it intends the goods – for
example use under unusual climatic conditions or special public law requirements in the
country of use – it is decisive if a reasonable person in the shoes of the seller could have
recognized the particular purpose from the circumstances.22 In answering this question
much will depend on the situation of the seller, its standing in the market, its knowledge
and experience in international trade. Furthermore, the buyermust have reasonably relied
on the seller’s skill and judgement.23 As a rule, there will be such reliance if the seller is a
specialist or expert in themanufacture or procurement of goods for the particular purpose
intended by the buyer or in any event holds itself out to be such a specialist.24This formula
leaves ample leeway to accommodate the interests of both parties and is flexible enough
to take into account if the parties come from different parts of the world.
If neither special contractual features nor a particular use can be established, the seller
must deliver goods that are fit for the purpose for which goods of the same description are
ordinarily used, i.e. they must be fit for the ordinary use.25 Again, in determining whether
the goods conform to this requirement,much emphasis is to be laid on the relative standing
and situation of the respective parties.26 If the buyer is in the resale business, the goods
must be resalable.27 The possibility to resell goods in a specific market depends to an
increasing degree on compliance with certain manufacturing standards and practices.28
The same applies with regard to public law requirements, namely, provisions under
domestic public law for the protection of consumers, workers or the environment, such
as product safety provisions but also provisions that refer to the origin of the goods on the
basis of their ability to be exported to a certain country.29 In international practice it is
highly disputed whether in such a case the standards of the seller or those of the buyer
apply. Notably, the German30 but also the Austrian31 Supreme Courts generally advocate
reference to the situation in the seller’s state, arguing that the seller cannot be expected to
21 Art. 35(2)(b) CISG.
22 Schwenzer, supra note 15, Art. 35, para. 22, with further references in n. 126.
23 Art. 35(2)(b) CISG.
24 Schwenzer, supra note 15, Art. 35, para. 24.
25 See Art. 35(2)(a) CISG.
26 Cf. Schwenzer, supra note 15, Art. 35, para. 14.
27 Cf. Schwenzer, supra note 15, Art. 35, para. 14.
28 Schwenzer, supra note 15, Art. 35, para. 14.
29 Schwenzer, supra note 15, Art. 35, para. 17.
30 BGH, 8 March 1995, CISG-online 144, BGHZ 129, 75, 81; BGH, 2 March 2005, CISG-online 999, NJW-RR
2005, 1218.
31 OGH, 12 April 2000, CISG-online 576, IHR 2001, 117, 120; OGH, 27 February 2003, CISG-online 794, IHR




be aware of the particular requirements in the buyer’s state or in the state where the goods
will be used. Other courts, however, applied the standards in the buyer’s state.32 Thus, if a
seller sells a medical device to a buyer in the US it clearly must comply with the require-
ments set up by the US FDA.33 Although, these approaches seem to be irreconcilable, in
my view a sensible solution for international trade can be achieved on a case by case basis.
Thus, if a Brazilian farmer exports crops it might not be expected to know about detailed
public law requirements in the country of use. Here indeed, the buyer is in a better position
to draw the attention of the seller to such regulations. However, where a global player of
canned foodstuff sells to a Brazilian chain of supermarkets, it is in a far better position to
ascertain the relevant public law requirements that exist for marketing the products in
Brazil. In this field, too, is it very possible to reach results that strike a fair balance between
the seller and the buyer.
5.2.3 Examination and Notice Requirement
Likemany legal systems influenced byGermanic legal thinking,34 and especially alsomany
Ibero-American Codes of Commerce,35 the CISG imposes on the buyer a duty to examine
the goods and to notify the seller of any non-conformity.36 If the buyer fails to do so it is,
in principle, deprived of any possibility to rely on the lack of conformity.37
The provisions on examination andnotice belonged to themostly debated issues already
during the Vienna Conference.38 First of all, representatives from so-called developing
countries stressed the unacceptable consequences of a rigid notice regime for buyers from
32 Medical Marketing International Inc v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica, S.R.L., 17 May 1999, U.S. Dist. Ct.
(Eastern District of Louisiana), CISG-online 387; CA Grenoble, 13 September 1995, CISG-online 157, JCP
1996, IV, 712; LG Ellwangen, 21 August 1995, CISG-online 279; RB Rotterdam, 15 October 2008, CISG-
online 1899, note z.6.
33 Medical Marketing International Inc v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica, S.R.L., 17 May 1999, U.S. Dist. Ct.
(Eastern District of Louisiana), CISG-online 387.
34 Cf. German (§ 377 HGB), Austrian (§§ 377, 378 HGB) and Swiss Law (Art. 201 OR).
35 E.Muñoz, ‘Modern Law of Contracts and Sales in Latin America, Spain and Portugal’, in I. Schwenzer (ed.),
International Commerce and Arbitration, Vol. 6 (Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2011) p. 323.
36 See Arts. 38, 39 CISG.
37 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 422, para. 34.02.
38 I. Schwenzer, ‘The NobleMonth (Articles 38 & 39)’ (2006) VII(3/4) European Journal of Law Reform p. 356;
K. Sono, in C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell (eds.), Commentary on the International Sales Law (Giuffrè, Milano
1987) Art. 44, para. 1.2: ‘probably the most heatedly debated among all the provisions in the Vienna Con-
vention’; P. Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law: The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (Manz, Vienna, 1986) p. 69; J.O. Honnold, in H. Flechtner (ed.), Uniform Law for International
Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention (4th edn., Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 2009)
p. 365, para. 254.1.
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such countries.39 But they did not stand alone; they were joined by representatives from
countries whose domestic legal systems did not provide for any notice requirement.40They
also feared that their traders might be unduly penalized, since they were unlikely to be
aware of the requirements until too late.41 However, a suggestion to delete the notice
requirement entirely was not successful.42 Instead, a compromise could be reached.43
First and foremost, by the very wording of the respective articles in the CISG, the
timeframes for examination and notice are muchmore liberal than under many domestic
legal systems.44Whereasmany commercial codes call for prompt examination and notice,45
the CISG contends itself with an examination “within as short a period as is practicable
under the circumstances”46 and a notice “within a reasonable time” after discovery of the
non-conformity by the buyer.47 If the seller knew or could not have been unaware of the
lack of conformity it may not rely on the failure by the buyer to give timely notice of the
non-conformity.48 Most of all, the CISG has introduced a provision that is unknown to
any legal system containing a notice requirement.49 If the buyer has a reasonable excuse
for its failure to comply with the examination and notice requirement, it may still reduce
the purchase price or claim damages – except for loss of profit.50 Thus the buyer is granted
at least minimum remedies to make up for the non-conformity of the goods.
Analysing the provisions on examination and notice neatly reveals the CISG’s quest
for fairly balancing the opposing interests of seller and buyer. Establishing an examination
and notice requirement in the first place clearly is in the interest of the seller. It places the
seller in a position to possibly remedy the lack of conformity by delivering missing or
substitute goods, by repair, or by reducing the buyer’s loss in some other way. It also enables
the seller to prepare for any negotiations or dispute with the buyer and to take the necessary
steps, for example by securing evidence. Furthermore, the seller may need to prepare a
claim against its own supplier who may be responsible for the non-conformity. However,
if the seller does not deserve such a protection the scale tips towards the buyer. And if the
39 H. Flechtner, ‘Buyer’s Obligation to Give Notice of Lack of Conformity (Articles 38, 39, 40 and 44)’, in R.A.
Brand, F. Ferrari & H. Flechtner (eds.), The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond: Cases, Analysis and
Unresolved Issues in the UN Sales Convention (Sellier, München, 2004) p. 378.
40 Schwenzer, supra note 38, European Journal of Law Reform, p. 356.
41 Official Records (A/Conf.97/19), Summary Records, First Committee, 16th Meeting, para. 32.
42 I. Schwenzer, in I. Schwenzer (ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary on the UN Convention on the
International Sale of Goods (CISG) (3rd edn., Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) Art. 39, para. 2.
43 Id.
44 Cf. Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 431, para. 34.41.
45 Cf. The Commercial Codes of Germany, Austria and Switzerland, supra note 34.
46 Art. 38 CISG.
47 Art. 39 CISG.
48 Art. 40 CISG.
49 Schwenzer, supra note 38, European Journal of Law Reform, p. 356.
50 Art. 44 CISG.
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buyer itself is not blameworthy for not giving notice, the loss that has ultimately been
caused by the seller’s breach of contract is distributed between both parties.
It was not always easy for domestic courts to adequately interpret these CISGprovisions
on examination and notice. All too often they have been tempted to interpret these rules
against their well-known domestic background.51 Thus, it does not come as a big surprise
that courts from a Germanic legal background interpreted the provisions on examination
and notice in a rather strict way.52 In contrast, in case law from countries that do not have
any examination and notice requirement in their domestic legal system, very often the
issue is not even touched upon. Probably, neither the courts, nor the parties or their
counsel are even aware of this possibly powerful weapon.53 With the development of the
CISG, however, there seems to be at least some convergence which not only benefits the
uniform interpretation of the CISG butmostly the parties of an international sales dispute.
5.3 Remedies upon Breach of Contract
Let me highlight the CISG’s approach in another very central area; the field of remedies
upon breach of contract by one of the parties.
5.3.1 Structure of Remedies
Naturally, the way in which remedies for breach of contract have been established and
structured, their relationship to each other, and finally their operation are strongly influ-
enced by the legal traditions and general principles of the individual legal systems.54 The
variety of solutions offered by legal systems can be broadly categorized by two general
approaches, namely the “cause-oriented approach” and the “breach-of-contract approach”.55
Under the first approach, specific breaches trigger specific remedies.56 In other words, it
must first be determinedwhat type of disturbance in the performance occurs to determine
the available remedies.57 Under the second approach the same set of remedies is triggered
51 This is illustrated most clearly in the appendix to CISG-AC Opinion No. 2, available at:
<www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op2.html>; also C.B. Andersen, ‘Reasonable time in the CISG – Is
Article 39(1) Truly a Uniform Provision?’, in Pace Review of the CISG 1998 (Kluwer Law International,
Netherlands, 1999) pp. 63-177.
52 E.g. LG Stuttgart, 31 August 1989, CISG-online 11; OLG Düsseldorf, 8 January 1993, CISG-online 76; LG
Frankfurt a.M. 11 April 2005, CISG-online 1014; Tribunale civile di Cuneo, 31 January 1996, CISG-online
268; OGH, 27 August 1999, CISG-online 485; OGH, 14 January 2002, CISG-online 643.
53 Cf. Schwenzer, supra note 38, European Journal of Law Reform, p. 362.
54 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 533, para. 41.01.
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by all types of breach of contract.58 In other words, it does not matter in which way the
performance of the contract was disturbed, the remedial response is always the same.59
The cause-oriented approach is predominantly followed by traditionally structured
civil law legal systems,60 especially also in Ibero-American countries.61 Impossibility, delay,
non-conformity and breaches of ancillary obligationsmust be neatly distinguished as they
have different prerequisites and trigger different consequences. It goes without saying that
this approach is highly complicated. More often than not it is hard for the aggrieved party
to predict which remedy will apply and to react accordingly, for instance to give adequate
notice which is only necessary in cases of a defect but not in cases of a partial non-perfor-
mance or breach of an ancillary duty. The cause-oriented approach in case of doubt favours
the party in breach to the detriment of the aggrieved party.
The breach-of-contract approach is traditionally followedby common law jurisdictions.62
The outcomes under this approach are much more predictable as the remedies do not
depend on the specific cause of a breach but rather on its intensity. Therefore, the CISG
rightly followed this approach. In the meantime, its superiority has been proven by the
fact that many legislators in civil law countries have replaced the cause-oriented approach
by the breach-of-contract approach when recently updating their civil codes.63
Another advantage of the CISG is the sheer structure of the remedies. The remedies
of an aggrieved party as a consequence of a possible breach by the other party systematically
follow the enumeration of the breaching party’s obligations. This in itself makes the CISG
easily understandable for any lawyer who is not extraordinarily sophisticated as would be
necessary to comprehend for example the intricacies of English, French or German
domestic law.
Let me now turn to briefly discuss the two most important remedies, namely damages
as well as avoidance of the contract.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 534, para. 41.05.
61 Muñoz, supra note 35, p. 381.
62 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 540, para. 41.34.
63 For China and modern East Asia codifications see S.J. Yang, TheModern Sales Contract in Asia, University
of Basel, Doctoral Thesis Basel, 2011, pp. 8 et seq., paras. 2.13 et seq.; M. Käerdi, ‘Die Neukodifikation des
Privatrechts der baltischen Staaten in vergleichender Sicht’, in H. Heiss (ed.), Zivilrechtsreform im Baltikum
(Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2006) p. 25; P.Varul, ‘TheNewEstonianCivil Code’, inHeiss (ed.),Zivilrechtsreform
im Baltikum (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2006) p. 52; V. Mikelenas, ‘Unification and Harmonisation of Law
at the Turn of theMillenium: The Lithuanian Experience’ (2000)Unif L Rev, pp. 243 et seq.; H. Sono, ‘Japan’s
Accession to and Implementation of the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods




With regard to damages, a comparative overview reveals significant differences between
domestic legal systems.
Civil law legal systems, in general, tend to favour the contract breacher to the detriment
of the aggrieved party. This is the result of a number of features adding up. First, under
civil law legal systems fault is required as a prerequisite for damages.64 In case of non-
conformity of the goods a considerable number of civil law legal systems allow for damages
of the buyer only if the seller knew or should have known the defects.65 Otherwise, the
buyer is restricted to the classical Roman remedies of avoidance (actio redhibitoria) or
reduction of the purchase price (actio quanti minoris).66 Furthermore, recoverable losses
very often are limited; a strict principle of prohibiting overcompensation is applied.67 In
case of doubt, the case is decided in favour of the contract breacher.
In contrast, common law legal systems started from the opposing pole. Any breach of
contract entails a damages claim. Additionally, these systems originally took a very hard
line in that there was no excuse from liability where the breach was caused by something
beyond the control of the breaching party, which was only softened in the nineteenth
century.68However, a limiting effect was found in the so-called contemplation rule, insofar
as recovery was restricted to losses that were within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of the conclusion of the contract.69
Against this background, the CISG achieved a compromise that balances the interests
of both, the aggrieved party and the party in breach. Like the common law, the CISG is
based on the principle of strict liability.70 Damages may be awarded without any fault on
the part of the contract breacher.71Thus it offers amuch better protection of the aggrieved
party than under civil law. However, more generously than under common law, the
breaching party may be exempt from paying damages if the failure to perform was due to
an impediment beyond its control that was neither foreseeable nor avoidable.72This covers
64 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 592, para. 44.63.
65 Cf. Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 594, para. 44.79.
66 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 594, paras. 44.77, 44.78.
67 General non-recoverability of non-pecuniary damages, see Germany, §253(1) CC; The Netherlands Art.
6.95 CC; references in 2008Draft Common Frame of Reference prepared by the StudyGroup on a European
Civil Code, p. 921, para. 13.
68 See Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B & S. 826 (1863).
69 Cf. Schwenzer,Hachem&Kee, supranote 4, p. 596, para. 44.87&p. 600, para. 44.104. See Hadley v. Baxendale,
9 Ex 341 (1854). A commendable and instructive overview of the proceedings and their perception at the
time and subsequently is provided by F. Faust, ‘Hadley v. Baxendale – an Understandable Miscarriage of
Justice’ (1994) 15 Journal of Legal History pp. 41-77.
70 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 650, para. 45.06.
71 I. Schwenzer, in I. Schwenzer (ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary on the UN Convention on the
International Sale of Goods (CISG) (3rd edn., Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) Art. 74, para. 3.
72 See Art. 79(1) CISG.
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not only cases classically known as force majeure situations but – as is today almost unan-
imously held – also cases of hardship where the equilibrium of the contract has been fun-
damentally altered; in other words performance of the contract has become excessively
onerous for the obligor.73 Furthermore, again as under common law legal systems, the
breaching party is only liable for losses that it foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time
of the conclusion of the contract.74 For the rest, the principle of full compensation applies;
that means any and all losses are recoverable.75 This system again is flexible enough to
yield just and equitable results in a large variety of international settings.
5.3.3 Avoidance
There is hardly any agreement between different legal systems as to when a party may
avoid the contract because its performance has been disturbed.76 Not only do they adopt
divergent views on the means by which a contract may be avoided – ipso iure, by court
decision or by the aggrieved party’s simple declaration77 – but in particular, different
approaches can be found as regards the preconditions for avoidance. Many legal systems
of all civil law as well as of common law origin still follow the cause-oriented approach as
regards avoidance and distinguish between impossibility, delay and defective performance,
especially in the form of non-conformity of the goods.78 Furthermore, in quite a few civil
law legal systems not only the remedy of damages but also avoidance may only be granted
where the breaching party has been at fault.79 Thus, avoidance can easily turn out as a
booby trap, if for example, the aggrieved party did not declare avoidance in time relying
on facts that indicated a case of ipso iure avoidance that later proved to be false.
The CISG has considerably simplified the remedy of avoidance not only as regards the
means by which the contract is avoided but especially in relation to the prerequisites for
exercising this important remedy. Avoidance is the harshest of all remedies as it deprives
73 I. Schwenzer, ‘Force Majeure and Hardship in International Sales Contracts’ (2009) 39 Victoria University
of Wellington Law Review pp. 713-714, with further references in nn. 23-24, 31-32. I. Schwenzer in I.
Schwenzer (ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of
Goods (CISG), (3rd edn., OxfordUniversity Press, NewYork, 2010) Art. 79, para. 30, with further references
in n. 95; CISG-AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG,
12 October 2007, Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro M. Garro, Wuhan (China), para. 3.1.
74 See Art. 74 CISG.
75 I. Schwenzer, supra note 71, Art. 74, para. 3; CISG-ACOpinionNo. 6: Calculation of Damages under Article
74, Spring 2006, Rapporteur: Professor John Y. Gotanda, Stockholm (Sweden), para. 1.1.
76 CISG-AC Opinion No. 5, The Buyer’s Right to Avoid the Contract in Case of Non-Conforming Goods or
Documents, 7 May 2005, Rapporteur: Professor Dr. Ingeborg Schwenzer, Badenweiler (Germany), para.
1.2.
77 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, pp. 753 et seq., para. 47.180.
78 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, pp. 714 et seq., paras. 47.26 et seq.
79 For delay Germany § 286(4) CC. Probably also Taiwan Art. 230 CC.
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the breaching party of all benefits of the contract. Furthermore, in an international context
it may entail the necessity of transporting back the goods already shipped from their place
of destination to their place of origin or another place which usually involves additional
considerable transportation costs.80 Therefore, under the CISG avoidance is regarded as
a remedy of last resort, an ultima ratio remedy.81 Only if the aggrieved party cannot be
adequately compensated especially by damages it may claim avoidance.82 In principle,
avoidance can only be asked for if the breach has certain gravity, if it constitutes a so-called
fundamental breach.83 Under certain circumstances, the aggrieved party may avoid the
contract after having given the other party an additional period of time for performing its
obligations.84
Under the CISG, a breach is fundamental “if it results in such detriment to the other
party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract”.85
All kinds of contractual obligations – especiallymain and additional obligations, synallag-
matic and non-synallagmatic obligations, obligations to perform or to refrain from doing
something etc. – are treated alike.86 The obligation may be expressly provided for in the
CISG, such as delivery of conforming goods and documents at the right time, at the right
place etc., but it may also be a sui generis obligation agreed upon by the parties, such as
information, training of employees, refraining from reimport, non-competition etc.87
Whether the breaching party was at fault is not decisive in establishing a fundamental
breach, although some authors argue that an intentional breach should always be regarded
as being fundamental.88
The aggrieved party must be substantially deprived of what it was entitled to expect.
Insofar the importance of the interest which the contract creates for the promisee is crucial.89
It is the contract itself that not only creates obligations but also defines their respective
importance for the parties.90 Thus, if delivery by a fixed date is required, the interest in
80 J.O. Honnold & H.M. Flechtner, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Con-
vention (4th edn., Kluwer, Netherlands, 2009) Art. 25, para. 181.2.
81 M. Müller-Chen, in I. Schwenzer (ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary on the UN Convention on
the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (3rd edn., Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) Art. 49, para.
2; e.g. Bundesgerichtshof, 3 April 1996, CISG-online 135; Oberster Gerichtshof, 7 September 2000, CISG-
online 642; Landgericht München, 27 February 2002, CISG-online 654.
82 I. Schwenzer, ‘The Right to Avoid the Contract’ (2012) Belgrade Law Journal, p. 207.
83 Cf. Müller-Chen, supra note 81, Art. 49, para. 2.
84 See Arts. 49(1)(b) CISG and 64(1)(b) CISG.
85 Art. 25 CISG.
86 Cf. U. Schroeter in I. Schwenzer (ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary on the UN Convention on the
International Sale of Goods (CISG) (3rd edn., Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) Art. 25, para. 15.
87 Id.
88 Schroeter, supra note 86, Art. 25, para. 19; U. Magnus, ‘The Remedy of Avoidance of Contract under CISG
– General Remarks and Special Cases’ (2006) 25 The Journal of Law and Commerce p. 426.
89 I. Schwenzer, ‘The Right to Avoid the Contract’ (2012) Belgrade Law Journal, p. 209.
90 P. Huber & A. Mullis, The CISG – A New Textbook for Students and Practitioners (Sellier, München, 2007)
p. 214.
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taking delivery on that very date is so fundamental that the buyer may avoid the contract
regardless of the actual loss suffered due to the delay in delivery.91 Likewise, in the com-
modity trade where string transactions prevail and/or markets are highly volatile, timely
delivery of clean documents is always of the essence.92
Finally, the CISG provides for an element of foreseeability. A breach cannot be deemed
fundamental if the breaching party “did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same
kind and in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result”.93 Some authors
opine that lack of foreseeability and knowledge is a kind of subjective ground for excusing
the party in breach.94 However, knowledge and foreseeability are instead relevant only
when interpreting the contract and ascertaining the importance of an obligation.95 The
parties themselves can clarify the special weight given to an obligation; in English legal
terminology this would be a “condition”.96 The importance may also be manifested by
relying on trade practice and usage.97A reasonable person would have foreseen this. Once
the importance of an obligation to the promisee under the contract has been established,
the promisor will not be heard when alleging that it did not or should not have foreseen
the fundamentality of the breach of this obligation.98
As it all amounts to simple questions of contract interpretation, it is clear that the
decisive point in time to establish the importance of the obligation is the time of the con-
clusion of the contract.99 Later developments cannot upgrade a former minor obligation
to an important one even if the obligor is aware of this fact.100
In cases of non-delivery by the seller, non-payment or failure to take delivery by the
buyer – but only in these cases – the aggrieved party may fix an additional period of time
for performance and after the lapse of that time declare the contract avoided.101This concept
91 Schroeter supra note 86, Art. 25, para. 23.
92 I. Schwenzer, ‘The Danger of Domestic Pre-Conceived Views with Respect to the Uniform Interpretation
of the CISG – The Question of Avoidance in the Case of Non-Conforming Goods and Documents’ (2005)
34(4) Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, p. 806; CISG-AC Opinion No. 5, The Buyer’s Right to
Avoid the Contract in Case of Non-Conforming Goods or Documents, 7 May 2005, Rapporteur: Professor
Dr. Ingeborg Schwenzer, Badenweiler (Germany), para. 1.2, with further references in n. 62.
93 Art. 25 CISG.
94 E.g.W.A.Achilles,Kommentar zum UN-Kaufrechtsüberkeinkommen (CISG) (Luchterhand,Neuwied, 2000)
Art. 25, para. 13: ‘Verschuldenskorrektiv’ (‘fault corrective’); M. Will, in C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell (eds.),
Commentary on the International Sales Law (Giuffrè, Milano, 1987) Art. 25 n. 2.2. et passim; F. Enderlein
& D. Maskow, International Sales Law (Oceana, New York, 1992) Art. 25, n. 4.1.
95 Schroeter supra note 86, Art. 25, para. 27.
96 Schwenzer, supra note 92, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, p. 796; see Sale of Goods Act 1979
(UK), S 11.
97 Schwenzer, supra note 89, Belgrade Law Journal, p. 209.
98 See Appellationsgericht Basel-Stadt, 22 August 2003, CISG-online 943.
99 Schroeter supra note 86, Art. 25, paras. 32 et seq., with further references in n. 118; Oberlandesgericht Düs-
seldorf, 24 April 1997, CISG-online 385.
100 Schwenzer supra note 92, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, p. 210.
101 See Arts. 49(1)(b) CISG and 64(1)(b) CISG.
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has been borrowed fromGerman law and is known as theNachfrist-principle.102 If, however,
non-conformity of the goods does not in itself amount to a fundamental breach of contract,
the possibility to transform a simple breach of contract into a fundamental breach of
contract by setting a Nachfrist does not exist.
In any case of breach of contract avoidance can only be effected byway of declaration.103
No ipso iure avoidance exists under the CISG – even in cases of initial or subsequent
impossibility.104 This contributes much to legal certainty, clarity and predictability.
5.4 Conclusion
It has been said that the CISGmay be called a true story of worldwide success which is not
only proven by the ever increasing number of member states around the world but also
by the fact that during the last 20 years the CISG has served as the decisive role model for
law-making in the area of contract law on the international as well as on the domestic level.
It is most of all its remedy mechanism that makes the CISG so attractive. As has been
shown, the rules of the CISG are flexible enough to accommodate the interests of the seller
as well as the interests of the buyer, or, more generally, the interests of the obligor and the
interests of the obligee. One of its core principles being “reasonableness” there is no need
to resort to domestic concepts such as good faith. The CISG itself strikes a fair balance
between the interests of the parties and will yield fair and just results.
102 Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 4, p. 737, para. 47.112.
103 Cf. Art. 26 CISG; Müller-Chen, supra note 81, Art. 49, para. 23.
104 Cf. Müller-Chen, supra note 81, Art. 49, para. 23; OGH, 6 February 1996, CISG-online 224.
91
5 The CISG – A Fair Balance of the Interests of the Seller and the Buyer

